SPARK
Sparking active mobility actions for climate-friendly cities

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Local Governments for Sustainability

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Policy Pathways to Finance Tactical Urbanism in the Philippines

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This publication was developed with support from the **German Federal Government** through its **International Climate Initiative (IKI),** under the IKI Medium Grants funding program. The SPARK project is implemented with funding from IKI, which supports climate and biodiversity projects in developing and emerging countries on behalf of the **German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action.**

The SPARK project is led by **ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability World Secretariat** in collaboration with **ICLEI Southeast Asia Secretariat** and the **Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities.**

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Introduction

Tactical urbanism (TU) refers to the use of low-cost, adaptable interventions in public space that enhance mobility, safety, and accessibility.

It includes measures such as protected bike lanes, pedestrian zones, intersection redesigns, and traffic calming strategies implemented using scalable and context-sensitive approaches.



Illustration of Tactical Urbanism interventions for the Spark Project Pilot along A. Mabini street

In the Philippines, TU is increasingly recognized as a practical method for testing and informing broader infrastructure planning, especially as cities respond to persistent road safety challenges, congestion, and climate-related disruptions in the urban environment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, local governments in cities such as Makati, Taguig, Manila, and Mandaluyong introduced new bike networks and reallocated street space to accommodate walking and cycling. These initiatives demonstrated how street environments could be reconfigured to serve a wider range of users, particularly under conditions of constrained transport access. However, implementation experiences also exposed limitations in

institutional uptake. Most TU initiatives lacked integration into local investment plans and were implemented outside regular budget cycles, often supported by external partners or discretionary funds. The absence of dedicated funding lines, legal recognition, and technical guidance constrained their continuity and scale-up within existing national and local planning systems.

This policy brief focuses specifically on the financing dimension of TU. In particular, it explores various financing pathways, including local budget allocation, national support programs, public–private partnerships, and community-led initiatives; and assesses the enabling and constraining factors for resource mobilization. The analysis also incorporates insights from community surveys and focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted in two pilot sites: Maginhawa Street in Quezon City and A. Mabini Street in Pasig City.

The objectives of this policy brief are to:

01 Define TU and explain its relevance to urban mobility and public space improvements in the Philippine context;

02 Summarize implementation experiences from the pilot interventions, with attention to funding sources, cost structures, and sustainability concerns;

03 Identify barriers in current budget systems, procurement rules, and institutional mandates that limit the integration of TU into regular government programming;

04 Map the financing roles of national agencies, local government units (LGUs), and potential partners in supporting TU implementation and scale-up;

05 Recommend policy options for creating more stable, predictable, and flexible financing mechanisms for TU.

This brief aims to inform national and local strategies for embedding TU within mainstream urban development programs by focusing on the funding dimension. It emphasizes the need for clearer institutional mandates, better coordination across national and local government agencies, and financing tools that enable cities to move beyond ad hoc pilots and toward sustained implementation of people-centered street design.

Spark Project pilot along Maginhawa, Quezon City

Tactical Urbanism in Practice

Recent TU demonstrations in Metro Manila offer concrete insights into the implementation, outcomes, and challenges of reallocating street space through short-term interventions. One such pilot took place along Maginhawa Street in Quezon City between December 2024 and February 2025 under the SPARK project (Sparking Active Mobility Actions for Climate-Friendly Cities). The intervention converted the two-way commercial corridor into a one-way street, as well as introduced a painted active mobility lane, expanded pedestrian space through parklets and seating, and installed traffic calming signage. One side of the street was cleared of parking to create a shared space for pedestrians and cyclists. The pilot was implemented by the city's transport and planning offices in coordination with the Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities (ICSC) and ICLEI-Southeast Asia, aiming to test low-cost walkability measures in a dense, mixed-use area.

Road murals and street kiosks along Maginhawa Street

The intervention produced mixed results based on survey data and FGDs with residents, barangay officials, and local businesses in the area. On the positive side, pedestrian accessibility improved, as over 60% of surveyed users expressed satisfaction with the walking environment. The respondents also noted that street crossing was easier and that vehicular speeds were lower than it was before the TU intervention. No traffic road crashes were reported during the pilot, and city officials observed no significant increase in congestion. These outcomes suggest short-term safety and mobility benefits. However, challenges emerged during implementation. FGDs with business owners revealed concerns about reduced customer access, with some establishments reporting decreased revenue. A major convenience store cited a 60% decline in sales during the pilot period, attributed to limited parking and disrupted delivery logistics. At least three businesses were reported to have closed during the same period, although causality remains unclear. Additionally, intercept surveys indicated no measurable increase in bicycle usage, and some residents opted to use tricycles instead, pointing to persistent gaps in local transport connectivity. The bike lane itself was described by some as underused and difficult to navigate in wet conditions, raising concerns about design suitability and surface materials.

Operational issues also affected project sustainability. Barangay-level enforcement was limited, with only four "tanods" assigned in the project area and no supplemental funding for maintenance or traffic management. Support from the city's traffic unit was gradually reduced over time. By early 2025, most of the tactical features had been removed. Despite these limitations, the pilot was seen by the city as a partial success. It demonstrated the feasibility of reconfiguring street space but underscored the importance of stakeholder coordination, context-sensitive design, and clear planning for operations and maintenance. Lessons from this pilot include the need for early engagement with businesses, provisions for loading and unloading, durable materials, and sustained enforcement capacity.

From March to June 2025, Pasig City implemented a TU pilot along a section of A. Mabini Street as part of the SPARK project. The site connects Plaza Familia in Barangay Kapasigan, which is a civic plaza adjacent to a major church with surrounding residential and institutional areas. The intervention introduced shared pedestrian and bicycle lanes, marked crossing zones, informational signage, and heritage-themed murals. Additional features included improved lighting, seating, and a community book-sharing station. Unlike the Maginhawa Street project in Quezon City, the A. Mabini demonstration did not fully restrict motor vehicle access but redistributed space in favor of non-motorized users.

Road murals and historical displays along A. Mabini street

Observations and stakeholder feedback indicated increased use of the space for both mobility and recreation. Barangay representatives from Kapasigan and Malinao noted a rise in pedestrian activity, particularly during the evening. A significant portion of visitors in the area were aged 10–19, suggesting the area had become more attractive to students and youth groups. FGDs with barangay officials also highlighted improved perceptions of safety and accessibility, and both communities expressed interest in sustaining the improvements beyond the trial. Several factors contributed to the smoother implementation in Pasig City than in Quezon City. The pilot was located in a civic zone with fewer commercial establishments, reducing opposition related to parking or loading access. The active involvement of barangay leaders also facilitated operations, as they participated in mural painting, maintenance, and public engagement. The volunteers also helped spread awareness about the project. No major complaints were reported from transport operators. However, one challenge identified was the presence of street dwellers, which required barangay-level management. Another challenge was the lack of public awareness about the project's external funding, as many assumed it was led solely by the LGU.

Cost–Benefit Insights Across Both Pilots

Both TU pilots under the SPARK project were implemented with minimal local budget outlays, relying primarily on external support and executed at a relatively small scale. Temporary materials and short-duration interventions were used to test street-level changes in Quezon City and Pasig City. Despite the low cost of implementation at both sites, early economic assessments revealed that the pilots produced negative short-run financial outcomes. This result was mainly attributed to the decline in weekday commercial activity surrounding the project sites during the implementation period.

Figure 1 illustrates the results of the cost–benefit analyses by comparing two key values for each pilot, namely, the net present value (NPV) and the monetized environmental and transport-related savings. NPV, in this context, refers to the estimated net gain or loss from the project after accounting for all quantified benefits and costs over the pilot period. A negative NPV means that during the short time frame evaluated, the losses, particularly from reduced economic activity near the site, exceeded the measurable gains from aspects such as improved pedestrian access or reduced vehicle emissions. For both sites, the environmental and transport-related savings were positive but relatively modest. They included reductions in vehicle operating costs and greenhouse gas emissions, which are common benefits when streets are reallocated toward non-motorized use. However, those gains were outweighed by the recorded losses in business activity, particularly on weekdays, leading to an overall negative NPV for each site.

From the perspective of urban economics, this pattern reflects a typical transitional effect when road space is reconfigured in favor of public or pedestrian-oriented uses. Businesses that rely on predictable vehicle traffic or quick turnover, as in the case of Maginhawa Street, often experience temporary declines in customer access and visibility, especially in the absence of compensatory measures such as targeted marketing, pedestrian routing, or weekday programming. While such declines may dissipate over time as users adapt to the new space configuration, the short-term impact can appear stark in early-stage evaluations. This underscores the importance of phased implementation, ongoing monitoring, and support to affected business operators when introducing street-level changes that alter traffic and

Figure 1

Estimated Net Present Value and Monetized Benefits of Tactical Interventions in Maginhawa and A. Mabini.



Source: Author's construction based on project survey and focus group data from Quezon City and Pasig City pilots.

consumer behavior. Table 1 shows how the two pilot sites differed not only in their design and cost structures but also in their observed effects during the short-term implementation window.

Both pilot initiatives under the SPARK project demonstrate that TU can yield immediate improvements in public space use and perceptions of safety, even when it is accompanied by short-term economic trade-offs. In Quezon City, satisfaction surveys reflected generally favorable pedestrian experiences, while in Pasig City, measured pedestrian activity increased during the intervention. Both sites also generated co-benefits not directly reflected in commercial revenue, such as reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and enhanced community use of public space, as observed in the activation of Plaza Familia as a gathering point in Pasig City. However, the pilots also surfaced key operational and stakeholder-related challenges. Local businesses, particularly in Quezon City, raised concerns about reduced access for

Table 1

Cost–Benefit and Usage Outcomes of Tactical Urbanism Pilots.

Indicator (3–4 month pilot)	**Maginhawa St., Quezon City**	**A. Mabini St., Pasig City**
Implementation period	**December 1, 2024–February 2, 2025 (with gradual phaseout by April 2025)**	**March 25, 2025–June 25, 2025**
Key interventions	Converted a former parking lane into a 3-meter shared pedestrian-cyclist lane; added parklets with seating, bicycle racks, regulated parking bays, solar lighting placed in front of Brgy. Teachers' Village East Hall, and hosted interactive events in the area.	Painted 1.5-meter shared pathways for walkers, cyclists, and persons with disability; introduced placemaking at Plaza Familia with murals, seating, lighting, a small public library, and bike boxes at intersections.
Total implementation cost	₱2.03 million (materials and labor).	₱1.20 million (mostly funded by ICSC). City expenses are minimal.
Short-term economic result (net present value [NPV])	NPV: –₱14.67 million over 124 days (net loss). Cost–Benefit Ratio: –6.36	NPV: –₱991,294.80 over 92 days (net loss). Cost–Benefit Ratio: 0.16
Environmental benefits (greenhouse gas [GHG] and volatile organic carbon [VOC] reduction)	Estimated savings of ₱203,520 from GHG and VOC reductions over a 124-day period.	Estimated savings of ₱193,315 with an 8% reduction in GHG emissions and fuel use over 92 days.
Change in foot traffic and usage	Weekend walking increased from 69.6% to 70.4% while biking rose from 8.9% to 10.4%. Weekday volumes for both pedestrians and bicycles rose slightly.	Walking share in the area increased from 49.7% to 55.1% while cycling declined from 12.7% to 10.9%. Similarly, weekend pedestrian count rose at one station, with broader declines recorded on weekdays. Bicycle volumes dropped on weekdays and recorded slight increases on weekends.

Public satisfaction	About 60% of the users surveyed in the area expressed their satisfaction with the walking environment. Respondents also noted the improvements in crossing conditions and reported calmer traffic movement during the course of the pilot period.	Community feedback highlighted the improved safety and pedestrian experience in the area. Barangay officials also observed increased public space use and noted the area's active role as a gathering point.
Local business impact	Several businesses along the corridor experienced sales declines during the pilot period, with some reporting losses of around 60%. Some business owners attributed the reduction in revenue to limited parking availability and lower vehicular access, viewing the intervention in the area as a temporary disruption to their regular operations.	There was pushback among businesses during the pilot. Barangay officials did not receive formal complaints from street vendors or tricycle drivers operating in the area.
Safety outcomes	Crash frequency declined from 1.64 to 1.00 per month, which is a reduction of about 39%. No pedestrian-related crashes were reported during the course of the pilot. However, vehicle speed rose slightly, with the 85th percentile speed increasing from 27 to 31 kilometers per hour after the corridor was converted to one-way traffic after the intervention.	No crash incidents were recorded during the pilot. The 85th percentile speed rose marginally from 26.2 to 27 kilometers per hour, although this change is not statistically significant. Most tricycle drivers reported no safety-related issues throughout the course of the implementation period.

Source: Author's construction based on project survey and focus group data from Quezon City and Pasig City pilots.

deliveries and parking, which they linked to declining sales. These concerns may lead to resistance against extending or institutionalizing tactical interventions. Future efforts may benefit from mitigation measures such as scheduling delivery windows, maintaining limited vehicle access for logistics, or organizing promotional events to attract foot traffic to reduce perceived business disruption. As the following sections will explore, embedding TU within planning and financing frameworks will be critical to sustaining such interventions over time. Addressing both the technical and institutional dimensions can help ensure that tactical projects contribute not only to immediate urban improvements but also to longer-term strategies for safer, more inclusive street environments in the Philippines.

Policy & Legal Context

This section outlines the policy and legal provisions that shape the use of TU in cities across the Philippines, including those related to infrastructure programming, road ownership, right-of-way restrictions, and development planning instruments.

It identifies areas of regulatory clarity, discretionary interpretation, or operational constraint that directly affect how local governments plan, fund, and execute such interventions. The analysis also highlights ongoing efforts to better institutionalize design flexibility and responsive urban management within the mandates of key agencies while noting where gaps in jurisdiction, coordination, or guidance continue to limit broader adoption.

Spark team in dicussion with Maginhawa stakeholders and the local government unit

National Transport and Urban Development Policies.

High-level policy frameworks such as the National Transport Policy and the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2023–2028 identify multimodal transport, road safety, and pedestrian infrastructure as development priorities. The PDP, in particular, calls for reduced car dependency and improved walkability in urban centers. Similarly, the National Urban Development and Housing Framework and planning guidelines released by the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD) support compact, people-centered communities. However, these policies are directional and programmatic. They do not mandate specific budget allocations for active mobility or TU projects. With the exception of time-bound allocations during the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., under the Bayanihan legislation), there is currently no permanent national funding program for bike lanes, pedestrian improvements, or short-term pilot projects. Local governments must often finance TU initiatives from general budget sources, which are frequently oversubscribed. The absence of a dedicated subsidy or cost-sharing scheme places pressure on LGUs with limited fiscal space to justify funding experimental projects that may fall outside their mandated service delivery.

Local Government Code and LGU Budgeting Processes.

Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, LGUs are authorized to manage local roads, traffic regulation, and land use planning. They receive a National Tax Allotment (NTA), which is an unconditional block grant that can, in principle, fund mobility and street improvement projects. To access these funds, TU projects must be incorporated into the LGU's Annual Investment Plan (AIP) and Local Development Investment Program (LDIP) and be aligned with the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP). In practice, tactical projects compete with multiple priorities for limited funding. The NTA is not earmarked for transport or public space development, and expenditures on short-term, small-scale interventions may be deprioritized in favor of capital-intensive infrastructure such as roads or health facilities. The 20% Local Development Fund component of the NTA may be used for TU if it is classified as a capital investment aligned with existing plans. However, experimental projects are often not recognized as capital expenditures under prevailing interpretations. Two additional earmarked funds, which are the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund and Gender and Development Fund, offer limited but potential support for TU. Some LGUs in the country have used these for sidewalk improvements or lighting enhancements tied to safety and inclusivity. Accessing these funds requires framing TU in terms of disaster risk reduction or gender equity (e.g., creating safer, well-lit routes for women and vulnerable populations), which may not apply to all interventions. Overall, while LGU fiscal frameworks provide some flexibility, there are no guarantees that TU will be funded, and local executives may be cautious in allocating their financial resources to non-traditional projects that may be questioned in local audits.

National Government Support Programs and Incentives.

LGUs may also access national government funding through competitive programs. The Local Government Support Fund (LGSF) includes subprograms such as the Assistance to Cities (LGSF-AC) and the Seal of Good Local Governance Incentive Fund (SGLGIF). These funds are typically awarded for capital projects, but TU components such as parklets or pedestrian improvements can potentially be included under broader urban renewal or transport categories. Precedent exists for national alignment with TU goals. The Green, Green, Green Program for instance provided grant funding for public space upgrades, including parks and bike lanes at the local level. However, these programs are sporadic, competitive, and administratively demanding. The LGSF-AC, for one, favors permanent infrastructure and requires detailed proposals. Meanwhile, the SGLGIF is available only to LGUs that meet multi-sector governance performance criteria. While active mobility investments may be eligible, there is currently no dedicated performance incentive specifically targeting walkability or cycling improvements. In the absence of a sustained national grant window for TU, only a subset of resourceful LGUs can leverage these funds effectively.

Mandate Overlaps and Regulatory Ambiguity

Implementing TU projects also involves identifying the overlapping mandates among national government agencies (NGAs). For example, road jurisdiction in the Philippines is fragmented, as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) oversees national roads while LGUs manage city and municipal roads. TU projects involving reallocation of space on national roads require DPWH coordination. However, DPWH's mandate is oriented toward permanent road construction and vehicle throughput, and there is no formal protocol for approving partial, experimental street reconfigurations. Most LGUs have relied on informal communication to secure permissions, which introduces administrative uncertainty. The Department of Transportation (DOTr), through its Active Transport Office, plays a role in promoting bike and pedestrian infrastructure. In 2020, the DOTr and DPWH jointly issued design standards for bike lanes. These technical guidelines have helped align design practices across LGUs, but they do not clarify responsibilities for financing or maintenance. Pandemic-era bike lanes, for instance, were built by the DPWH as part of the Bayanihan Law but were later transferred to LGUs without dedicated funding for upkeep. As a result, facilities often suffer from degradation or inconsistent management.

The question of long-term responsibility remains unresolved. TU initiatives frequently fall between policy categories, treated either as transport, road, or urban development projects depending on the agency who will handle the project. For example, DHSUD's Resilient Urban Design and Development Guidelines encourage adaptable public spaces, but the agency's own operational focus remains on long-term housing and land development. Tactical interventions are not directly supported through DHSUD funding programs, and officials from the agency have acknowledged the need to further integrate people-centered approaches into their mandates. The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), for its part, issues memoranda encouraging LGUs to support active transport and public space use. However, without clear legal guidance, local law and traffic enforcement may view TU installations as irregular or non-compliant, especially when road markings and traffic flow are altered. In sum, the institutional environment for TU remains fragmented to this day. No single agency has a comprehensive mandate to promote, fund, and maintain tactical street interventions, and existing laws in the country provide limited formal recognition for temporary reconfigurations of public space. The lack of legal definitions, shared protocols, and cross-agency coordination frameworks results in regulatory ambiguity that can delay or discourage TU implementation at the local level. Table 2 summarizes several relevant policy instruments and how they align or conflict with tactical urbanism needs.

The policy review suggests that TU occupies a space within existing governance and financing systems but lacks formal institutional anchoring. Local governments have the legal authority to plan and implement tactical interventions and allocate funding through existing budget mechanisms. However, in practice, these projects compete with other local priorities, are rarely embedded in formal development plans, and receive limited technical or financial incentives to support sustained implementation. At the national level, agencies such as the DOTr, DPWH, DHSUD, and DILG have endorsed active mobility and people-centered street design in policy statements and technical guidelines. Nevertheless, TU remains largely absent from mainstream programs, funding streams, or regulatory frameworks. This disconnect means that implementation often depends on individual political will, such as a mayor initiating a pilot, or on support from development partners and civil society, rather than being treated as a regular component of urban management. As a result, TU projects are frequently implemented on a case-by-case basis, leading to variable outcomes in terms of design quality, public support, and long-term maintenance. The absence of standardized protocols, inter-agency coordination mechanisms, or sustained funding contributes to limited scalability and institutional continuity. The following section examines the roles, capacities, and constraints of key implementing actors and explores how clearer mandate alignment and coordination frameworks can improve the delivery and sustainability of TU at scale.

Table 2

Alignment of Key Mandates with Tactical Urbanism.

Policy / Mandate	Alignment with Tactical Urbanism	Gaps / Overlaps
Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160)	Cities/municipalities have authority over local streets and can reallocate road space via ordinances or executive orders (under the general welfare clause). LGUs control budgeting, as stated in their approved LDIP or AIP so they can fund walking and cycling projects if prioritized.	As of writing, there is no specific requirement to fund active transport. As such, tactical projects must compete with other services to get the funding it needs. The Code focuses on long-term development; thus, pilot interventions may be seen as non-priority.
Annual Investment Plan (AIP) and Local Development Investment Program (LDIP)	TU projects can be included in AIPs and multi-year LDIPs, legitimizing them in the budget process. If an LGU adopts an Active Mobility Plan, it can integrate tactical projects into these documents.	Tactical projects often yield intangible or non-permanent outputs, which may lead planning councils to rank them low. If not linked to an official sectoral plan or if viewed as "temporary," they may be dropped from the AIP. There is also no special treatment in budget rules, as it is subject to the same evaluation as permanent capital outlays.
Internal Revenue Allotment / National Tax Allotment (IRA/NTA).	It can be used for any project in the LGU's mandate. In principle, a mayor can allocate a part of the NTA to paint bike lanes, build parklets, etc., using the 20% development fund portion.	Tactical projects may be removed if the local revenue is tight or the political leadership changes. Moreover, maintenance of tactical installations must come from the same pot because of the risk of deteriorating later on. Multiple local needs also rely on NTA; as such, TU has no protected share unless a specific clause is introduced by the national government in the form of a republic act.
Local Government Support Fund – Assistance to Cities (LGSF-AC)	Cities can propose street redesign, sidewalk, or public space improvements under the LGSF-AC. Such tactical projects can fit urban development categories, tapping national funds for implementation.	The LGSF-AC has limited annual slots, and it favors capital-intensive projects that produce new infrastructure. Tactical, temporary projects might score lower unless framed as phase 1 of something that is permanent in nature. The fund is also episodic in nature, meaning that it has no assurance of continuous support for maintenance or scale-up. LGUs must have technical capacity to apply and comply, which smaller cities may lack.
DILG Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) and Incentive Fund	If an LGU excels in environmental management or disaster resilience relevant to active mobility, it receives bonus funds with discretion on use. Active transport can be funded if the LGU links it to their improvement areas (e.g., safer, greener city).	Current guidelines for the SGLG do not explicitly require bike lanes or walkability. In other words, an LGU can win the SGLG without ever building a bike lane. Thus, pursuing TU has no direct incentive. The grant can be used for anything that is "safe," and many LGUs choose conventional projects over experimental ones. The SGLG criteria also span multiple sectors, and mobility is indirectly included at best.

The policy review suggests that TU occupies a space within existing governance and financing systems but lacks formal institutional anchoring. Local governments have the legal authority to plan and implement tactical interventions and allocate funding through existing budget mechanisms. However, in practice, these projects compete with other local priorities, are rarely embedded in formal development plans, and receive limited technical or financial incentives to support sustained implementation. At the national level, agencies such as the DOTr, DPWH, DHSUD, and DILG have endorsed active mobility and people-centered street design in policy statements and technical guidelines. Nevertheless, TU remains largely absent from mainstream programs, funding streams, or regulatory frameworks. This disconnect means that implementation often depends on individual political will, such as a mayor initiating a pilot, or on support from development partners and civil society, rather than being treated as a regular component of urban management. As a result, TU projects are frequently implemented on a case-by-case basis, leading to variable outcomes in terms of design quality, public support, and long-term maintenance. The absence of standardized protocols, inter-agency coordination mechanisms, or sustained funding contributes to limited scalability and institutional continuity. The following section examines the roles, capacities, and constraints of key implementing actors and explores how clearer mandate alignment and coordination frameworks can improve the delivery and sustainability of TU at scale.

Policy Options for Local Governments

Local governments should approach TU as a flexible, catalytic strategy rather than a one-size-fits-all solution to address localized mobility constraints.

With this mindset, LGUs can integrate TU into their policies and programs in practical ways that complement broader people-centered development goals. Key policy options include the following:

1. **Mainstream TU into Existing Plans and Budgets.**
   LGUs that aim to support TU initiatives are not required to create new funding categories or programs labeled specifically as "tactical urbanism." Instead, they may explore embedding TU activities within existing plans, appropriations, and infrastructure programs. This approach is more aligned with the current structure of LGU budgeting and planning processes, which prioritize programmatic continuity and compliance with mandated investment frameworks such as their approved CDP, AIP, or LDIP. Under this strategy, tactical interventions such as intersection redesigns, reallocation of curb space, traffic calming installations, and delineated pedestrian corridors may be framed as subcomponents of existing functional areas. For example, modest reallocations for street safety improvements can be justified under climate adaptation programs (particularly if they mitigate heat exposure or enhance resilience in flood-prone zones), traffic management projects (if they reduce congestion or organize circulation), or road safety interventions (if they respond to areas with a history of pedestrian–vehicle conflict). The incorporation of such projects should follow the thematic logic that is already present in the LGU's development planning framework.

   At the national level, NGAs such as the DOTr and DILG may support mainstreaming by formally including TU-related programs, activities, and projects (PAPs) in their public investment program (PIP) submissions. The Guidelines for the Updating of the PIP 2023–2028 issued by the Department of Economy, Planning, and Development (DepDev) specify that PAPs to be included in the updated PIP must be aligned with sectoral outcomes under the PDP 2023–2028. To be included, TU initiatives must be incorporated in the agency's forward estimates and budget proposals, supported by detailed project evaluation forms with logical frameworks, cost parameters, and implementation schedules. Given its potential contributions to road safety, climate resilience, and inclusive mobility, TU can be framed either as a standalone subprogram or as an implementation mechanism embedded in broader infrastructure PAPs, including those on pedestrianization, active transport, public space enhancement, and traffic management.
2. **Adopt a Flexible and Non-Prescriptive Approach.**
   TU should be introduced to local governments not as a mandated template but as a voluntary, context-sensitive planning strategy that can be adapted based on local conditions and institutional readiness. Given the diverse urban forms, traffic patterns, institutional capacities, and political dynamics across cities and municipalities in the Philippines, the imposition of uniform standards for TU may create confusion or discourage implementation. A rigid regulatory approach also risks misalignment with existing local development goals and administrative norms. Instead, a more viable path is to provide guidance documents, policy advisories, or recommended design strategies

that local governments can consult when considering tactical interventions. These instruments can take the form of planning advisories issued by DHSUD, technical memoranda developed in partnership with the DPWH or DOTr, or design handbooks produced with support from non-government organizations or international partners. They should remain non-binding and explicitly framed as recommendatory to allow LGUs to evaluate, adjust, or selectively adopt TU practices based on local needs, site suitability, and available resources. This approach also enables LGUs to determine whether and how to apply TU principles to situations in their area. For instance, a municipality may find TU suitable for school zones, market areas, or residential access roads but not for national arterial corridors with heavy freight movement. In such cases, having a range of possible interventions rather than a prescriptive checklist allows local planners and engineers to assess fit and feasibility. Using tools such as "design menus" or typology-based reference guides and listing options such as bulb-outs, curb extensions, painted bike lanes, or flexible bollards can be more effective than issuing national directives that assume uniform applicability.

3. **Implement Projects in Phases and "Pilot" Interventions.**
   TU is best introduced through pilot-scale interventions that allow LGUs to evaluate feasibility, impact, and operational requirements before broader adoption. A phased approach can begin with short-term modifications, such as painting curb extensions or pedestrianized zones in high-footfall areas. These interventions can be used to collect data on usage, safety, and public response within a defined period. If outcomes support the intervention's objectives, LGUs may proceed with adjustments, refinements, or scaled-up versions through permanent programs. Phased implementation is consistent with common budget cycles and procurement practices, and it allows departments to work within existing staff capacity. During the planning stage, LGUs should establish criteria for assessing pilot results and clearly define transition mechanisms in the event of program continuation. This method enables the practical testing of design assumptions and institutional procedures under real-world conditions, reducing the risk of prematurely committing resources to interventions that may not be well suited to their intended context.

4. **Ensure Policy Harmonization and Inter-Agency Coordination.**
   TU projects often require coordination among agencies that have overlapping jurisdiction over roads and public spaces. For instance, interventions along national roads necessitate consultation with the DPWH, whereas projects affecting mobility or traffic management may involve the DOTr, DILG, or MMDA. To prevent administrative delays or regulatory inconsistencies, LGUs should initiate early coordination with these agencies during the planning phase. This coordination can include requesting technical input, aligning project goals with existing national priorities, and clarifying any permitting or compliance requirements. Engagement may be formalized through the creation of joint working groups, agency consultations, or memorandum-based coordination mechanisms. Participation in incentive-based national frameworks, such as the SGLG, may also reinforce support for tactical interventions when project outcomes are aligned with measurable indicators, such as improved pedestrian safety or reduced exposure to hazards. Harmonizing local TU actions with broader national programs facilitates more efficient project execution and reduces the risk of policy conflict.

5. **Engage Communities and Rebrand for Public Support.**
   TU initiatives are more likely to be sustained when residents and stakeholders are consulted early and clearly understand the project's purpose. LGUs should identify affected communities at the outset and engage them in defining local mobility or safety issues, such as limited pedestrian space or recurring traffic incidents near schools or markets. Where feasible, co-design sessions may be organized with barangay leaders, civil society groups, or neighborhood associations to refine project features and identify practical constraints. Public communication materials should avoid technical jargon and instead use language that reflects local values or conditions. LGUs can test terms such as makataong daan to describe pedestrian-focused interventions, which have been better received than generic terms such as "pilot pedestrian project." Adopting accessible, locally relevant naming conventions can help clarify intent and improve community acceptance. In addition to naming, local governments should provide residents with practical information about the timeline, goals, and nature of the project. Signage, announcements,

or barangay briefings may be used to explain the changes and encourage feedback. This kind of outreach helps manage expectations and allows for early identification of problems or misalignments. Projects framed in these terms are more likely to be assessed on their operational impact rather than their novelty, enabling LGUs to respond constructively to feedback and to plan for revisions or continuation. Over time, consistent community engagement may also support broader participation in urban planning efforts beyond the scope of these tactical interventions.

When applied within existing institutional frameworks, the policy options outlined above can support the gradual integration of TU into local planning and infrastructure management. Pilot interventions that are modest in scale and cost can serve as entry points for testing approaches to pedestrian safety, circulation management, or public space activation. These projects may offer early insights into what design elements or operational models are workable under current conditions. However, for these interventions to inform longer-term improvements, they must be intentionally linked to established planning goals and budgeting mechanisms. Local governments are encouraged to position tactical projects not as stand-alone efforts but as incremental measures that respond to specific, documented needs, such as reducing conflicts at pedestrian crossings or improving non-motorized access in school zones. Where positive outcomes are observed, follow-up action should be planned and resourced accordingly. Maintaining this focus on function and alignment with local development priorities helps ensure that TU is integrated in a manner that is both feasible and administratively supported. Over time, this strategy can allow tactical methods to become a routine part of how LGUs plan, implement, and adjust street-level interventions.

Recommendations & Next Steps

Implementing the policy options presented in the previous section will require deliberate planning, considering that TU is an iterative process.

Rather than adhering to fixed timelines, local officials should focus on establishing a foundation for planning, capacity-building, and stakeholder engagement before introducing visible street-level changes. The pace of implementation will depend on local context, resource availability, and coordination needs. The following steps outline how LGUs can initiate and sustain TU using existing institutional tools and support systems.

Capacity building workshop with Quezon City and Pasig City Local Governments, the Department of Transportation (DOTr), the Department of Economy, Planning, and Development (DEPDev), the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and Clean Air Asia

- **Initiate a Pilot Project through a Cross-Department Team.**
  Begin by forming an internal working group consisting of staff from planning, engineering, traffic management, budget, and community affairs units. This group should identify one or more priority sites for a TU pilot, using criteria such as observed pedestrian congestion, proximity to high-use public facilities, or documented traffic safety concerns. Site selection should be guided by available data, routine field observation, or community input where applicable. Once a site has been identified, the working group should develop a detailed implementation plan, including design elements, timelines, materials, and traffic rerouting if necessary. Where interventions affect national roads or fall within the scope of other agencies, the LGU should seek coordination or formal clearance from the relevant body, such as the DPWH or MMDA, to ensure consistency with infrastructure standards and avoid procedural conflicts. The pilot design should also be accompanied by a set of clear and measurable indicators, such as changes in vehicle speeds, pedestrian counts, user satisfaction, or recorded incidents within the intervention area. Baseline data should be collected prior to implementation, followed by regular monitoring during the pilot period. This process will allow for an evidence-based evaluation of the intervention's performance and inform subsequent decisions about scaling, modification, or termination.

- **Leverage Existing Funding and Programs.**
  Funding for TU pilots can be drawn from within existing budget structures, without the need to establish new budget items or dedicated program codes. LGUs should identify relevant appropriations, such as those under road safety, pedestrian infrastructure, traffic management, local development, or climate adaptation, and assess whether the proposed intervention can be implemented as a subcomponent of an existing project. To facilitate budget approval, the intervention should be described using familiar language already reflected in the LGU's development plans or annual investment programs. For example, rather than referring to the activity as a "tactical urbanism project," it may be more appropriate to present it as a demonstration for neighborhood traffic calming, a pedestrian access improvement, or a street safety trial in a designated area. Framing the activity in this way aligns it with established development objectives and reduces ambiguity during internal budget review. Where external funds are available such as small grants from national government programs, local economic enterprise income, or private sector contributions through corporate social responsibility, these can be integrated into the same operational structure to supplement existing funding. LGUs should ensure that such resources are reported and programmed within the same administrative unit responsible for delivery to maintain consistency in oversight and accounting. Institutionalizing this approach enables smoother transitions from pilot to regular implementation. If a demonstration yields positive outcomes and stakeholder support, the project can be scaled or extended using the same funding stream in subsequent years, eliminating the need to renegotiate its budgetary justification.

- **Institutionalize Successful Measures and Plan for Scale-Up.**
  When a TU pilot demonstrates satisfactory outcomes based on defined evaluation criteria, LGUs should take steps to incorporate the intervention into regular programming. This may involve converting a temporary improvement, such as a painted walkway or traffic-calmed street, into a permanent project included in the city's AIP or LDIP. Relevant departments should be tasked with preparing the necessary project proposals, cost estimates, and design documentation to support the transition. These activities should be scheduled within the appropriate planning and procurement cycles to avoid disruptions in implementation or maintenance. To facilitate institutional uptake, planning offices may also revise its local manuals, standard operating procedures, or design guides to reflect TU methodologies. These updates can include documentation on pilot approval procedures, stakeholder engagement protocols, material specifications for interim use, and criteria for site selection and evaluation. Integrating these procedural elements helps standardize the approach across departments and allows future projects to draw from an established reference. LGUs may also develop a long-term implementation roadmap to guide expansion. This plan can identify priority corridors, intersections, or districts where similar interventions may be applied in phases.

Targets may be framed in terms of the number of sites upgraded, types of improvements introduced, or budgetary allocations committed over a specified period. Progress should be reviewed periodically and adjustments made based on emerging data, institutional capacity, and community response. LGUs reduce dependence on ad hoc efforts and increase the likelihood that TU will be sustained and adapted as part of regular urban governance by incorporating successful pilots into routine planning and budgeting.

- **Align with National Support and Incentive Programs.**
  Local governments implementing TU should coordinate with national agencies to ensure alignment with broader mobility, safety, and public space policies. Agencies such as the DHSUD, DILG, DPWH, DOTr, and MMDA can issue technical guidelines and fund programs that may support components of tactical interventions. Where applicable, LGUs may incorporate design standards or material specifications from these agencies, such as DOTr's active transport guidance or DPWH's pedestrian infrastructure standards, into tactical projects, provided that relevant standards have already been updated or revised to reflect current urban conditions. This is especially important in cases where older issuances such as Department Order No. 73 or Batas Pambansa Blg. 344 contain definitions or classification systems that may limit the practical application of people-centered street design. This alignment can improve regulatory compliance and enhance project legitimacy when reviewed by oversight bodies or internal auditing offices.

- **Incentive-based mechanisms may also support local implementation.**
  For example, inclusion of walkability or safety-related criteria in SGLG assessment can create indirect incentives for LGUs to pursue tactical projects that demonstrate measurable community benefit. LGUs may also advocate for TU to be reflected in relevant performance monitoring frameworks, award programs, or grant application guidelines. Monitoring policy issuances from national agencies remains important. If a new department order, planning advisory, or inter-agency guideline references TU or related approaches, LGUs should assess its applicability to local ordinances, planning documents, or funding proposals. Such references can provide institutional support for local initiatives and help align them with evolving national priorities. In parallel, LGUs are encouraged to participate in national-level working groups or technical committees when invited, or to submit feedback based on field experience prior to TU. Sharing implementation insights from local projects may help inform future policies, improve coordination, and identify additional opportunities for technical or financial support.

- **Targeted Capacity Building & Technical Assistance for Project Preparation.**
  TU initiatives often rely on the internal technical capacity of local governments to translate conceptual interventions into implementable projects. However, many LGUs face constraints in technical expertise, staffing, or experience in preparing projects to a standard suitable for inclusion in formal pipelines such as the PIP or the LDIP. To address this, a dedicated national mechanism may be established to provide targeted support for TU project preparation. This mechanism should include standardized planning templates, technical guidance documents, modular training programs, and diagnostic tools to guide LGUs through the entire process, from site identification and design development to cost estimation, stakeholder engagement, and monitoring frameworks. Templates may incorporate both narrative and tabular components to align with national submission formats, while training modules should be adaptable to varying levels of LGU capacity, including remote or underserved areas.

  The technical assistance facility should also support LGUs in exploring potential financial modalities to fund their respective TU initiatives. Project preparation guidance must therefore address not only technical design and planning processes but also the financial structuring of projects to suit different sources of support. It must include preparing proposals for public sector allocations, local economic enterprise investments, public–private partnership schemes, or their combinations through hybrid arrangements. Climate finance instruments may also be leveraged

for TU projects that contribute to mitigation or adaptation objectives. Guidance should help LGUs determine which modalities are appropriate for a given intervention and ensure compliance with relevant legal and financial requirements.

TU in the Philippines has the potential to shift from isolated, externally supported initiatives into a more embedded component of local urban governance. For this transition to occur, it must be treated not as a standalone program or symbolic intervention but as one of several practical strategies that local governments can draw upon to address specific mobility, safety, or public space issues. The experiences of LGUs such as Quezon City and Pasig City illustrate the opportunities created when a combination of local leadership, inter-agency collaboration, and community engagement are coordinated. Conversely, they also depict the limits when institutional support is weak or absent.

For TU to be sustained and scaled, national and local governments must take steps to clarify its status within planning frameworks, facilitate inter-agency harmonization, and support incremental implementation through technical assistance and policy guidance. This includes providing LGUs with flexible planning tools, recommended (but not mandated) design options, and access to relevant funding mechanisms already embedded in existing governance processes. When approached in this manner, TU can be adapted to different urban contexts and gradually institutionalized through practice, evaluation, and local decision-making. As noted in one of the stakeholder consultations, TU is most effective not when framed as a project type but when adopted as a procedural shift in how streets are managed and designed. Framing it as such allows local governments to focus on improving street function and accessibility based on available tools, capacity, and community input, without overstating what TU alone can deliver.


TEACHER'S VILLAGE
MAGINHAWA STREET
ATM
DALI


Isabel's
coffee house


BARRIO
KAPASIGAN
NOONG 1956
SOURCE: MS. THELMA MILLEZA


SPARK
PASIG
ICSC
ICLEI
ALAM MO BA?
Sa gabi ng Agosto 29, 1896, humigit-kumulang 2,000 Pasigueño mula sa mga baryo ng Pineda, Bagong Ilog, Ugong, Maybunga, Caniogan, Santolan, Rosario, Palatiw, Sagad, Poblacion (San Nicolas, San Jose, Santo Tomas, Santa Cruz, Malinao, Sumilang), Pinagbuhatan, Bambang, Kalawaan, at Buting ang nagtipon sa pangunguna ni Heneral Valentin Cruz.
Bitbit lamang ang kanilang mga bolo, sibat, karit, ilang baril, at matinding hangaring makamit ang kalayaan, nagmartsa sila upang bawiin ang kanilang bayan. Habang naglalakad, sinalubong sila ng mga mamamayan na buong pusong sumuporta at nagbigay ng sigaw ng pag-asa.
Pagsapit nila sa Plaza de la Paz (ngayon ay Plaza Rizal), isang sniper mula sa tore ng simbahan ang bumaril at nakapatay ng isang taga-Bagong Ilog—ang unang Pasigueñong nagbuwis ng buhay para sa kalayaan. Hindi natinag, sinalakay ng mga rebolusyonaryo ang Tribunal de Naturales (ngayon ay Jollibee Caruncho Ave. Branch) at ang himpilan ng Guardia Civil (ngayon ay tahanan ng pamilya Guanio), kung saan nakakuha sila ng 17 piston rifles at tatlong Remington.
Sa gabing iyon, ipinagdiwang ng mga Katipunero ang kanilang pinakaunang tagumpay sa himagsikan—isang makasaysayang pangyayaring kilala bilang Nagsabado sa Pasig.
SOURCE: Pasig City Cultural Affairs and Tourism Office (CA